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IN THE SUPREM.E CO'URT 
of the 
STA-rE OF U'TAH 
THE s.TA:T·E INS1URANCE F·UND, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
T;HE INDUS:TRIAL ~c:O·MMISSION 
OF UTAH, and JAME~S F. TAYLO·R, 






BRIEF OF D·EFENDANT JA1fE,S F. TAYLOR 
NATiURE OF T·HE CAS.E 
This is an appeal from the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION BEFO·RE THE 
IND·UST·RIAL CO·MMIS.SION 
On June 15, 1964, defendant Jarnes F. Taylor \vas 
awarded compensation for total and perrnanent disabil-
ity due to silicosis under the provisions of Chapt<·r 2, 
Title 35, U.1C.A. 1953. The a\vard was made against 1Tni-
ted Park City Mines Company and the State Insurane<> 
Fund, its occupational disease insurance carr i P r. 
RE·LIEF SO·UGH·T IN P:L.AIN·TIF·F''S PETITION 
The plaintiff, The State Insurance Fund, seeks to 
have the Supreme 1Court reverse, vacate and annul the 
award which the Industrial ~c·ommission rnade to James 
F. T·aylor, in so far as it relates to the liability of thP 
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State Insurance Fund to pay the benefits set forth in 
the Order of ·The Industrial Commission. 
S·TATEMEN·T· OF FACT·S 
D·efendant, James F. Taylor, agrees with the state-
ment of facts contained in plaintiff's brief, but notes 
certain additions thereto. 
James F. Taylor filed his claim dated May 9', 1962 
for .disability due to the occupational disease of silicosis, 
with the Industrial Com1nission of Utah on June±, 1962 
(R .. 1, 90). 
ARGUME·NT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT TAYLOR WAS EXPOSED TO HARMFUL 
QUANTITIES OF SILICON DIOXIDE DUST FOR MORE 
THAN FIVE YEARS BETWEEN JUNE 4, 1947 AND JUNE 
4, 1962. 
Prior to April 20, 1938, defendant Taylor had in 
excess of thirteen years of harmful exposure to silicon 
dioxide dust while employed by Silver King ,c·oalition 
Mines Company in underground mining as a mucker, 
motorman and a pipe and track man. (R. 56-57) 
Commencing January 31, 1939, Mr. ·T·aylor acted 
as a watchman and worked on the surface for Silver 
King ~Coalition Mines Co1npany. 
Between January 1, 19·39' and 1950 ~Ir. Taylor in his 
e1nploy1nent as a watch1nan for the Silver King ,c·oalition 
Mines Cornpany "ras required to punch various time 
clock stations located in the sampler and the flotation 
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1nill of the Co1npany. To reach these various stations 
Mr. Taylor passed through the Inain haulage way from 
the 1nain shaft to the Inill and sampler, which is enclosed 
in a weather tight snow shed. The passage of the ore 
and waste trains created a dust condition similar to that 
in underground haulage (R. 65·-69). In the sampler, 
the concentrated dry ores are dumped by a skip into 
large bins falling approximately 100 feet. From these 
bins they are drawn out into buckets of an aerial tram-
way for shipment to Park City (R. 69'-70). Mr. Taylor, 
in the course of his employment, during the afternoon 
and graveyard shifts of each working day, was required 
to punch each station five times on the afternoon shift 
and eight times on the graveyard shift (R. 70). Other 
stations located in the flotation mill required passage 
through the crushing department of the mill and across 
the crude bins of the mill four times each shift (R. 71-72). 
In September of 1950, Mr. Taylor became watchman 
at the P'ark 'City terminal of the aerial tramway, where-
in the concentrated ores were dumped into bins in the 
terminal building preparatory to ship1nent in railroad 
cars. The concentrated ores were loaded into box cars 
by a mechanical belt device which threw the ores from 
the door of the box cars to the extreme ends. All of 
such activity produced exposure to silicon dioxide dust 
(R. 73-75). 
·On May 8, 1953, the Silver l(ing 'Coalition Mines 
Company merged with the Park Utah 'Consolidated 
Mines 'C'ompany and became the United Park City 
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Mines Co1npany. Mr. Taylor was off \vork because of a 
strike and shutdown between August 15, 1952 and Octo-
ber 22, 1954 (R. 59-60), during \vhich time the merger 
took place. Upon return to work, Mr. Taylor was trans-
ferred by United Park City ~fines ~Company to thP 
watchman job at the Judge unit. Mr. Taylor, in 
the course of his employment, would sweep a half car-
bide can of mine ore and waste from the floor of the 
change room each shift (R .. 75-76). He was required to 
sweep and clean the haulage way and the snow shed 
which became littered from mine ores being shipped by 
leasers. Further exposure to dust was created by dump-
ing the ores from the floor of the snow shed to trucks. 
below for shipment (R. 76-77). This course of employ-
ment continued until Mr. Taylor was laid off June 30, 
19'61. 
The exposure of ~{r. Taylor upon his recall to work 
between February 3, 1962 and February 8, 1962 was no 
different than his exposure bet\veen October 22, 19·54 
and June 30, 1961. It is significant that he \vorked shifts 
of twelve hours each and \vas required to and did shovel 
a ton and one-half of coal into a hopper approximately 
5-1/2 feet high (R. 106). We subn1it this to be rather 
vigorous activity for a Inan whom plaintiffs would have 
this Court believe to be totally disabled prior to this 
time in order to bar his clai1n by application of the one 
:Tear statutP of limitations. 
WP submit that the Co1nmission's finding the de-
f(~ndant Taylor \vas exposed to harinful quantities of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
silicon dioxide dust for a total period of Inore than five 
years in this State during the fifteen years immediately 
preceding his disablement, is supported by substantial 
co1npetent evidence having probative value. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM WAS FILED WITHIN THE 
TIME LIMITATION OF 35-2-48, U.C.A. 1953. 
We believe it to be fundrunental law that a statute 
of limitations does not commence to run until a cause 
of action arises. A cause of action arises under the Oc-
cupational Disease Act when there is a disability or 
death due to an occupational disease. 
What is the meaning of the term "disability"~ The 
term is defined in the Act at 35-2-12 u.~c·.A. 1953, the 
pertinent parts of which are set forth as follows: 
"35-2-12. CONS·CT·RUC·TIO·N OF TE~RMS. 
-The following terms as used in this act shall be 
construed as follows : 
" (a) 'Disablement' means the event of be-
coming physically incapacitated by reason of an 
occupational disease as defined in this act from 
performing any work for remuneration or profit. 
Silicosis, as defined in this act, when complicated 
by active pulmonary tuberculosis, shall be pre-
sumed to be total disablement. 'Disability', 'dis-
abled', 'total disability,' or 'totally disabled' shall 
be synonymous with 'disablement', but they shall 
have no reference to 'partial permanent disabil-
ity'. 
'' ( e') 'Partial p·ermanent disability', as herein 
used, is defined as that pathological condition di-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
rectly resulting froin an occupational disease and 
causing substantial physical impairment, evi-
denced by objective medical and clinical findings 
readily demonstrable, and which has reduced the 
e~arning capacity of the employee, excluding, how-
ever, total disability cases." (Emphasis ours) 
Plaintiff argues that defendant Taylor was disabled 
when he first demonstrated symptoms of silicosis. This 
argument assumes that the first stages of silicosis are 
tantamount to disability in some form which starts the 
statute of limitation running. This argument ignores 
the facts shown in the record that defendant was gain-
fully employed from 19'3'3 when the first symptoms of 
silicosis were noted to the 30th day of June, 19·64 when 
defendant was laid off because of a reduction in forces. 
D'efendant Taylor was physically capable of returning to 
work during the period from February 3rd to February 
8th of 19162 inclusive and performing work for remuner-
ation or profit while working a 12 hour shift on each 
of the days included in the period. (R. 111) The work 
record of the defendant Taylor is a part of the record of 
this case (R. 116) and is as follows: 
"'Silver King ~c·oaiition Mines Company 
19~25 to 4-20-38 Underground trackman 
1-31-39 to 7-1-50 Surface Watchman 
9-16-50 to 8-15-52 Surface watchman 
United p·ark City Mines Company 
10-22-54 to 6-30-61 Surface watchman 
2-3-62 to 2-8-6·2 Surface watchman 
Defendant's \vork record demonstrates that during 
his entire \vorking life he has been employed by the Sil-
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ver King ~Coalition l\lines Company or its successor in 
interest, the United Park 'City Mines Company. Breaks 
in the work record are accounted for by industrial dis-
ruptions, shut-doV\rns and a disabling non-indusrial ac-
cident suffered by defendant T·aylor. 
Defendant's record of earnings during the course of 
his employment by United Park City Mines is significant 
in that it indicates the defendant was regularly and gain-
fully employed between October 22., 1954 to June 30, 
1961. Defendant's earnings during this period are a part 
of the record and are as follows : 
"10-2'2 to 12-31-54 
1-1 to 12-31-55 
1-1 to 12-31-56 
1-1 to 12-31-57 
1-1 to 12-31-58 
1-1 to 12-31-59 
1-1 to 12-31~60 
1-1 to 6-30-6·1 
$ 557.09 (R. 118) 
4,154.39 ( R. 134) 
4,316.22 (R. 119') 
4,521.39 (R. 120) 
4,4 72.85 ( R. 121) 
4,483.15 ( R. 122) 
4,262.89 ( R. 123) 
2,183.97 ( R.. 124) 
D·efendant was recalled to and did work between 
February 3rd and February 8th, 1962 and earned thP 
sum of $98.63 (R. 125). 
We think the earning record of the defendant clearly 
and fairly demonstrates that he was regularly engaged 
in work for remuneration or profit during the aforernen-
tioned period. 
As a matter of law that defendant could not be either 
totally disabled or partially disabled during the period 
ending June .30, 19·61. 
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Defendant was still physically able to return to work 
at the request of his employer and resume his normal 
occupation of watchman during the p·eriod between Feb-
ruary 3rd and February 8th, 1964, working 12 hour shifts 
and shoveling a ton and a half of coal into a hopper ap-
proximately 5-1/2 feet high (R. 106). 
Defendant Taylor filed his application dated May 
9, 19'612 with the Industrial Commission on June 4, 1962. 
This is less than four months from his February, 19,62 
employment and less than one year from his continuous 
course of employment commencing in October of 1954 
and ending June 30, 1961. 
The ~Commission found that his tentative permanent 
and total disability commenced as of June 4, 1962·. We 
submit that the sole question here is, whether or not 
there has been a mis-application of law, or is there no 
substantial evidence furnishing a reasonable basis to 
support a material find of fact~ The State Insurance 
Fund vs. The Industrial Commission of Utah,------ Utah 
------, 395 P.2d 541, ~case No. 10095, September, 1964. 
There seems to be no doubt by plaintiff that the de-
fendant is disabled from the occupational disease of sili-
cosis. The only question is as to "\Vhen the total disability 
occurred and \Ye submit that the Commission's finding of 
June 4, 19,62 is amply supported by the law and the evi-
dence. 
As to the portion of the plaintiff's brief wherein 
it is argued, since defendant Taylor was partially dis-
ablPd sineP 1952; and, sineP ht• failed to file an application 
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for partial disability within one year after the alleged 
disability, his claim for total disability is barred by ap-
plication of the one year statute of limitations ; fails, 
for several reasons. 
First, upon the basis of the records and files in this 
case, we do not believe that a finding of partial disability 
prior to June 30, 19'61 can be supported. There would 
also be grave doubt as to the supportability of any find-
ing of partial disability prior to the period of einploy-
ment between February 3rd and February 8, 1962. 
Second, even if a finding were made of permanent 
partial disability subsequent to June 30, 1961, it would 
be within the time limit of the one year statute of limita-
tions contained in 35-2-48, l_,.CA 1953, which is not applic-
able to partial disability. 
Third, the limitation of action set forth in 35-2-48, 
UCA 1g.53 does not apply to partial per1nanent disability, 
because the limitation of action provision of this Section 
is contained in 35-2-5·6 (b), UCA 1953 which is as follows: 
''(b) No compensation shall be paid unless such 
partial disability results within two years prior 
to the day upon which claim for co1npensation was 
filed with the Industrial 1Commission of Utah." 
Fourth, it is the position of defendant Taylor that 
the provisions for total disability contained in 35-2-1:; 
and the provisions for partial permanent disability con-
tained in 35-2-56, UCA 1953 create separate and distinct 
causes of action. A review of the legislative history of 
the two provisions will show that there was no liability 
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for partial disability, until the latter section was added 
by the L~aws of Utah, 1949, Chapter 51, Section 2. See 
the case of Masich vs. United States Smelting, Refining 
and Mining Co., 113 Ut. 101, 191 P.2d 612, wherein it was 
held that the Occupational Disease Act, Laws of Utah 
1941, 'Chapter 41, had pre-empted the field of disability 
due to silicosis and that even though there were no pro-
visions for partial permanent disability, there \vas no 
common law action for partial permanent disability due 
to silicosis. 
Fifth, with the passage of the partial permanent dis-
ability section, Laws of Utah, 19'49, ~Chapter 51, Section 
2, the Legislature saw fit to deal with partial disability. 
The conditions precedent to a claim for total disability 
due to silicosis are set forth in 35-2-13, UCA 1953, and 
may be summarized as follows: 
1. The last day of injurious exposure must 
be subsequent to July 1, 1941. 
2. There must be exposure to harmful quan-
tities of silicon dioxide dust for a period 
of five years during the fifteen years prior 
to disability; and 
(a) Disability must result within two 
years for uncomplicated silicosis; 
(b) Disability must result within five 
years for silico-tuberculoss 
from the last day worked for the employer 
against whom compensation is claimed. 
3. The claim must be filed pursuant to 35-2-
48, UCA 1953, within one year after the 
cause of action arises. 
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The conditions precedent to a claim for partial perman-
Pnt disability are set forth in 35·-2-56, UCA 19'53 and may 
be summarized as follows : 
1. T·he last day of injurious exposure must 
be subsequent to July 1, 1941. 
2. Partial disability must result within two 
years prior to the day upon which the 
claim was filed. 
3. p·artial disability must result within two 
years of the date of last exposure. 
We submit that the Legislature in providing for 
partial permanent disability for silcosis elected to treat 
partial disability in a substantially different manner 
than it treated total disability. The conditions precedent 
are different, as well as a different statute of limitations. 
As a practical matter, a simple way to emasculate the 
total disability provision of the Occupational Disease 
Act would be to adopt the theory urged by the plaintiff. 
Those applicants filing their claim with the Industrial 
·Commission for total disability, who had not prevously 
filed a claim for partial permanent disability, would be 
barred by the statute of limitations. We urge that it is 
the duty of this ·Court to interpret these provisions so 
that the intent of the Legislature in allowing compensa-
tion for partial permanent disability due to silicosis will 
not thwart an applicant whose disability has become total 
as measured by the provisions of the Act. 
Assume the case of an employee who suffers from 
silicosis which would be classified .as non-disabling, per 
se; assume that the employee continued in his einploy-
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rnent and was gainfully ernployed, even though he rnight 
suffer occasional loss of time because of the progressive 
nature of his disease but of insufficient amount to en-
title him to any rneasurahle compensation, in essence, 
the beginning of a reduction of his earning capacity; 
assume that the employee is rernoved from exposure type 
employment and continues for more than two years in 
this employment; then assume that the employee con-
tracts a case of tuberculosis super-imposed upon the sili-
cosis; under plaintiff's theory the employee is barred 
from filing for his total disability because he failed to 
file for partial disability. 
We submit that the adoption by this Court of plain-
tiff's theory will have harsh and unwarranted results. 
The solution is simply to treat the two causes of action 
separately as they were intended to be treated by the 
Legislature. The treatment is not without precedent in 
this jurisdiction where in this Court in Pacific States 
Cast Iron P'ipe Company vs. Industrial Commission, 18 
Ut. 46, 218 P.2.d 970, held that there were two separate 
and· distinct claims pending before the Commission in 
that the death claim of the dependent is a separate and 
distinct cause of action from the one running to the de-
ceased because of his injuries. 
Sixth, while defendant Taylor does not concede that 
there is any factual basis to support a finding of partial 
disability prior to February 8, 1962, Mr. ,T·aylor submits 
that as a matter of la-,v, the running of a statute of limit-
ations upon a claim for permanent partial disability due 
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to silicosis, does not bar a claim for total disability due 
to silicosis. 
P1aintiff cites and argues State Insurance Fund vs. 
Industrial Comrnission, 116 Ut. 279, 209 P.2d 558, refer-
red to hereafter as the Lunnen case, which cites and dis-
cusses Marsh vs. Industrial Accident Commission, 217 
Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 9.33, 86 A.L.R. 563. Defendant Taylor 
has no quarrel with the doctrine announced in these 
cases. Rather, it is felt that the plaintiff ignores the 
doctrine of the cases. There is a distinction between the 
symptoms of the progressive disease known as silicosis 
and the disability produced by the disease. Plaintiff re-
fuses to recognize that disability is a word of art and 
must be construed in accordance with the definitions 
contained in 35-2.-12, U.C.A. 1953. The cases talk about 
disability, not symptoms. We believe this can be illus-
trated by quoting the rule of the Lunnen case set forth 
in plaintiff's brief and found at P.age 283, Volume 116, 
Utah Reports: 
"The better rule which is in accord with rea-
son and justice, is that a cause of action does not 
arise until an ascert.ainable disability and com-
pensable disability results." 
This is the rule adopted in California. See Marsh vs. 
lndu~trial Accident Commisson *** (emphasis added) 
Again, illustrating the defendant's contention by di-
recting the ~Court's attention to the portion of Marsh vs. 
Industrial Accident Com.mission (cited above) quoted 
by plaintiff's brief, commencing at Page 9·38 of 18 P.2d: 
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"Froin our study of the subject we are 
brought to the conclusion that in the case of a 
latent and progressive disease, such as pneumo-
coniosis, it cannot reasonably be said that the in-
jury dates necessarily from the last day of ex-
posure to a dust-laden atmosphere and that the 
prescriptive period hegins to run from that date. 
Rather, according to our view, should the date of 
the injury be deemed the time when the accumu-
lated effects culminate in a disability traceable 
to the latent disease as a primary cause, and by 
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence it 
is discoverable and apparent that a compensable 
injury was sustained in performance of the duties 
of the employment." (emphasis added) 
Again direeting the Court's attention to State of 
Ca,Zifornia, Subsequent Injuries Fund, Petitioner, vs. 
Industrial Accident Commission of the State of Califor-
nia, ______ Cal. ------, 304 P.2d 112 at Page 114·, the doctrine, 
again emphasized by italics: 
"The date of injury in cases of occupational 
disease is that date upon which the employee first 
suffered disability therefrom, and either knew, or 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
known, that said disability was caused by his pre-
sent or prior employment." 
Nor do we believe that the case of Universal Granite 
Quarries Compa.ny vs. Tndustrial Commission, 224 Wise. 
680, 27:2 NW 863, assists the position of the plaintiff. 
In this case a stone cutter, age 69· years, after some 40 
years' exposure became sick and disabled in January 
of 1g.32. In FebruarY and March of 1932 his illness was 
•' 
diagnosed as tuberculosis. He was treated for tuber-
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culosis and in the Fall of 1934 the X-ray fihns diagnosed 
silicosis. He filed within thirty days of the X-ray diag-
nosis of silicosis. The ·Commission found: 
"The applicant knew that he had tuberculosis 
about February or March, 19.32; that he did not, 
however, know that he had silicosis or that his 
tuberculosis was caused by silicosis or by his 
employment until ex-rays were taken in the lat-
ter part of the year 1934 * * * that the applicant 
did not know until within thirty days prior to 
notice to the respondent, nor ought he to have 
known, the nature of his disability and its relation 
to his employment." 
The Supre1ne ~c·ourt reversed the Commission indi-
cating that the applicant was aware that stone dust was 
causing his sickness as early as 1930-31. He became sick 
in January and was completely disabled since that date. 
His claim was filed in the Fall of 1934, which is sub-
stantially in excess of the two year statute of limitations 
applicable in Wisconsin. Applying this case to the Utah 
Act, we would agree that the statute of limitations would 
run one year after the diagnosis of tuberculosis. Under 
35-2-12, UCA 1953, silicosis complicated by active pul-
monary tuberculosis shall be presumed to be total dis-
ablement. 
However, under the same definition found in 35-2-
12, UCA 1953, the defendant T·aylor could not be found 
to be totally disabled prior to February 8, 1962. He filed 
June 30, 1962, well within the one year statute of liinit-
ations. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
The only case which supports plaintiff's contention 
is that of Hutchinson vs. Semler, 227 Ore. 437, 361 P.2d 
803, decided May 10, 1951 ; rehearing denied June 
14, 1961, 362 P.2d 704. However, in reading the Hutch-
inson case, we were suprized to learn that the subject 
matter of that action was a common law action for dam-
ages. The Occupational Disease Act is the sole and ex-
clusive remedy of an applicant in Utah. The common law 
defenses of the fellow servant rule, contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk have been eliminated by 
our Act. The Oregon Court in Hutchinson concurred in 
the doctrine laid down in U rie vs. Thompson, 337 U.S. 
163 ; 69 S.1Ct. 1018, 1025; 93 L.E.d. 1282; 11 A.L .. R. 2d 
252, and announcing the following rule: 
"We concur in the rule enunciated in the Urie 
case and believe that their prior decisions are in 
accord with it. Thus, the statute of limitations 
began to run in the case at bar when the plain-
tiff became apprised, or as a reasonable man 
should have known, that his health was being un-
der mined by the dust which he was breathing." 
We do not quarrel with the rule announced by either 
the Hutchinson or the U rie case. We believe it to be the 
proper rule to apply in the case of a negligence action 
for exposure to har1nful or poisonous substances. How-
ever, it is not the proper rule to be applied to the Utah 
Occupational Disease Act which is a creature of statute 
and not the common law. The concept of disability is the 
concept created by the statute and. there can be no claim 
until there is a disability. 
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We again subinit that Ineasured by the standards 
of 35-2-12, -ucA 1953, there was no total disability prior 
to February 8, 1962 and no evidence to support a finding 
of partial disability prior to June 30, 19'61. The Com-
Inission has found that defendant Taylor became totally 
disabled as of June 4, 1962 which, in either event, is less 
than four months from his last exposure or employment 
and less than one year from a continuous course of em-
ployment dating back to October 22, 1954. We submit 
that there has been not misapplication of law and that 
there is substantial evidence furnishing a reasonable bas-
is to support the material findings of fact. 
POINT III 
LIABILITY MAY BE IMPOSED UPON THE STATE IN-
SURANCE FUND AS CARRIER, EVEN THOUGH APPLI-
CANT WAS NOT EXPOSED UNDER THEIR COVERAGE 
DURING A PERIOD OF THIRTY DAYS, OR MORE. 
It is the position of defendant Taylor that liability 
may be imposed upon the State Insurance Fund if, dur-
ing the period in which the State Insurance Fund was 
on the risk, Mr. Taylor was exposed to harinful quanti-
ties of silicon dioxide dust. This is the doctrine laid down 
in the case of Pacific Employers Insurance Company vs. 
Industrial Commission, 108 Utah 123, 157 P.2d 800, re-
ferred to as the Deza case: 
"The insurance carrier at the tit ne of the last 
exposure was the State Insurance Fund; this is 
the date which fixes the liability of the employer, 
and .consequently also attaches the liability to the 
employer's insurance carrier as of that date; and 
upon the whole record and from the clear wording 
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of the statute, the decision of the Comntission 
should have held the State Insurance Fund liable 
for the payment of compensation awarded." 
The Court will recall that the Industrial,Comntission 
had awarded compensation against Pacific Employers 
Insurance Company, who was the co1npensation carrier 
on the risk at the time Deza became disabled .. The ,c·ourt, 
in reversing the Commission, held that the carrier who 
was on the risk at the time of the last exposure was liable, 
which was the State Insurance Fund. D~eza had con-
tinued in the employ of the same employer, but during 
the coverage of the Pacific Employers Insurance ~Com­
pany was in non-exposure type employment. 
Thus, we feel the rule to be clear, if defendant Taylor 
was exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust 
in his employment between February 3 and February 8, 
1962., then the State Insurance Fund is the insurer who 
should respond. We think the record clear that Mr. ·Tay-
lor resumed his normal duties as watchman and in the 
course of these duties was exposed to quantities of silicon 
dioxide dust which to him were harmful. During the 
course of each 12 hour shift worked during this period 
defendant Taylor swept the change room floor (R. 75, 7-6, 
79') and the snow shed (R. 80). During the February 
period Mr. T'aylor's activities at work were essentially 
the same as they were during his prior employment at 
the Judge Unit (R. 179). While occupied in the sweeping 
of the change roo1n defendant Taylor would be sweeping 
for at least thirty minutes each shift (R. 99·, 110). The 
swet~ping activity would produce a one-half carbide can 
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full of Inine dust (R~. 110), which defendant Taylor indi-
cates as a can about half again as high as the waste 
basket in the hearing room (R. 113). 
Defendant Taylor in the course of his watching ac-
tivities vvas required to travel through the snow shed 
·wherein the dust condition \\Tas aggravated by the pass-
age of the trains hauling the ores and waste from the 
1nine (R. 76, 112). Defendant Taylor also swept the snow 
shed during the February period (R. 79, 80). 
It is readily apparent and the record so shows that 
Mr. T'aylor's activity during the period between Febru-
ary 3 and February 8, 196.2 was not substantially differ-
ent than his activity between Oetober 22, 1954 and June 
30, 1961. It is possible that this activitiy alone in a norm-
al unexposed employee would not produce harmful ef-
fects. However, in an employee such as defendant Tay-
lor, who has had some thirteen years of extremely harm .. 
ful underground exposure, the exposure in his watchman 
duties was an exposure to harmful quantities of silicon 
dioxide dust as to him. We submit that there is a casual 
relationship between this last exposure and Taylor's ul-
timate disability which occured June 4, 19'62. 
Plaintiff directs the Court's attention to Seetion 
35-2-14, UCA 1953, which is as follows: 
"***in the case of silicosis the only employer 
liable shall the employer in whose employinent the 
employee was last exposed to harmful quantities 
of silicon dioxide ( Si0 2 ) dust during a p·eriod of 
thirty days or more after the effective date of 
this act.'' 
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And, in effect, urges upon this ·Court the proposition 
that the defendant must be in the einploy of the ernploy-
er and in the coverage of the insurance carrier during a 
thirty day period since the effective date of this Act. 
The dangers of this theory were pointed out to the Court 
in the briefs filed in the State Insur.ance Fund vs. The 
Industrial ·Commission of Utah, 395 P.2d 541. The clear 
intent of this statute, in our opinion, is to differentiate 
between employers. It is not the last employer who is 
liable, but only the last employer who exposes the ern-
ployee to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust dur-
ing a period of thirty days. There is only one employer 
in this action. What we are determining is which of two 
insurance carriers should respond. 
We do not agree with the contention of the plaintiff 
the State Insurance Fund vs. Industrial Commission, 
·----- Utah ______ , 3~65 P.2d 541, controls this case in that the 
insurer must be on the risk for a period of thirty days or 
more. This case merely holds that, as to an employer, the 
employee need not \vork each day of the thirty day period 
nor need he be harmfully exposed each day during such 
period. It only requires harmful exposure and employ-
Inent during a period of thirty days. We submit that 
35-2-14, U:CA 1953, is not available to the insurer. His 
liability is based upon whether or not there is a casual 
connection between the exposure and the resulting dis-
ability. WP submit that there is ample evidence to sus-
tain the ·Commission's findings that the applicant was 
exposed to harmful quanities of silicon dioxide dust dur-
ing the period between February 3 and February 8, 1962. 
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Being on the risk and the employer having exposed de-
fendant Taylor to the harmful quantities during this per-
iod, the insurance carrier upon the risk at this time 
should respond. 
We sub1nit, that in a disease such as silicosis where 
the exposure is cun1ulative, liability is imposed on the 
last employer exposing the employee to harmful quan-
tities of silicon dioxide dust during a period of thirty 
days. The employer Inay not escape liability because· as 
a practical matter the overwhelming majority of the 
employee's exposure was in the employ of another em-
ployer. Kennecott Copper Corporation vs. Industrial 
Commission, 115 Utah 451, 205 P.2d 829. 
Hence, as to insurance carriers, the principle an-
nounced in Pacific Employers Insurance Company vs. 
Industrial Commission, 108 Utah 123, 157 P.2d 800, the 
~Court should impose liability on the insurer who was on 
the risk at the, 
"***date of the last exposure of the applicant to 
harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust,***" 
without the limitation of a period of thirty d.ays. Such 
a rule will be definite and put these matters to rest so 
that they may be handled on the administrative level 
rather than in the Supreme Court. Some hardship may 
result in that an insurer may be on a risk for a short 
time and suffer liability; however, the possibilities are 
just as good that the same insurance co1npany will es-
cape liability just as often by the application of such a 
rule. Otherwise, there will be continuing periods of non-
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coverage for a period of thirty days with each change 
of insurers. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we submit that there has 
been no misapplication of law and that the findings of 
the ~Commission are supported by substantial evidence 
furnishing a reasonable basis to support such findings 
of fact. The Order of the 'Commision awarding compen-
sation to James F. Taylor should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRAYTON, LOWE, & HURLEY 
AND~RE:W R. HURLEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
James F. Taylor 
R.eceived three copies of the foregoing brief this 
________________ day of December, 1964. 
ICiHARLE:S WEL1CH, JR. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CLYDE., MECHAM & PRATT 
Attorneys for Defendant 
United Park City Mines ·Co. 
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